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Is tort law, as claimed in a recent Vanderbilt Law Review article by Professor
1
John C.P. Goldberg, "unloved"? Is it true that "notwithstanding its continued
presence in the frrst-year curriculum, tort is a dep.artment.ofthe law that has fewer
2
serious champions than any comparable subdiscipline"? In a breathtaking spate
of recent writings, Professor Goldberg has sought to re-energize tort law and to spur
twenty-first century tort scholars to return to respe·cting and hopefully loving this
3
fottnerly venerated body of the law. In his 2002 essay Unloved: Tort in the

• Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; B~S., University of Pennsylvania
(Wharton School), 1973;J.D.,Comell University, 1977. MythanksgotoJolmC.P. Goldberg, Vincent
R. Johnson, Robert Rabin, and Piene Schlag for helpful comments regarding an earlier draft of this
article. As always, I am indebted to my J.D.·Ph.D. in English literature spouse, Teresa Faherty
·
Blomquist, for her loving and insightful comments.
I. John C.P. Goldberg, Unloved: Tort in the Modern Legal Academy, SS VANO.L. REv. 1501,
1503 (2002).
.
2. /d. at I 502.
3. See generally John C.P. Goldberg, Tort, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 21
(Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003) (focusing on the conception of tort law as accident and
regulatory law in twentieth century scholarship); Goldberg, supra note 1 (asserting that tort law
deserves a rebirth as a loveable and embraceable field of legal theory); John C.P. Goldberg, TwentiethCentury Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L. J. 513 (2003) (outlining the five lllost prominent approaches to tort
law in the twentieth century and suggesting measures to improve academic discourse in this area).

481

482

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56: 481

Modern Legal Academy, he eloquently described how academic lawyers of yore,
like William Blackstone, embraced tort law "as a small piece of what he took to be
4

the gorgeous mosaic of the liberal state's complex system of law." Goldberg
elaborated:
Just as the structure of English goverrunent King, Parliament,
y,
and conunon law helped protect rights against official
so [Blackstone loved] tort [for] defm[ing] and defend[ing] the
right not to be battered, detained, defamed, dispossessed or
otherwise injured by others. Tort therefore helped fulfill the
social contract. Upon entering civilized society, individuals give
up their natural right to wreak vengeance on their wrongdoers in
exchange for the positive legal power to invoke the apparatus of
5
the state to obtain legal redress from thern.

After Blackstone's love affair with torts in the eighteenth century, the youthful
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. had what Goldberg suggested was a dalliance with tort
6
law during the second half of the nineteenth century. "Holmes was the frrst
modem theorist of tort. As such, he presided over its reorientation around the tort
of negligence, as well as its corresponding elevation to the status of a major
7
department of the law."
With some wry jocularity, Professor Goldberg
acknowledged that while "it is a bit of a stretch to describe Holmes as a lover of
iort, fot he seems not to have been a lover of anything or anyone," Holmes
8
"mustered at least as much affection for tort as for anything else in his life."
According to Goldberg, with the advent of the twentieth century, tort gained
9
two more intellectual suitors in Francis Bohlen and Benjamin Cardozo. "Both men
devoted themselves to recrafting the conunon law of tort to better fit the new age
10
of industrial and motorized vehicle accidents." Indeed, Cardozo "saw in the
concepts and byways of the conunon law all the resources necessary to adapt
•

Goldberg and bis co-authors imply in the preface to their casebook that tort law is venerable because
it is so rich and adaptable:
This book adopts a perspective on (tort] law that we hope is refreshing. It is, of
course, vital that first-year law students come to appreciate that "the law, is not
a rule book that there is play in its joints and deep tensions in its soul. Yet it is
equally important that studentS not be left with the skeptical lesson that (tort) law
is nothing more than what a particular judge or jury says it is. Thus, in these
materials, we strive to help students grasp how the key concepts oftort concepts
such as "reasonable care," "causation," and "intentt' structure and organize
legal analysis even as they point it in new directions. A good lawyer, we hope to
demonstrate, is one who appreciates both the limits and the flexibility of tort
doctrine; one who has a sense of how to make innovative and progressive
arguments from within the law.
John C.P. Goldberg et at., Preface to TORT LAW: RESPONSIBIUTIES AND REDRESS XX (2004).
4. Goldberg, supra note 1, at l 504.
5. /d. at 1504 05.
6. See id. at 1505-06.
7. !d.
8. /d. at 1506 (citing GRANT GilMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 48-49 (1977)).
9. See id.
·
10. Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1506 (citing George Priest, The Invention ofEnterprise Liability:
A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461,
465-68 (1985))!
.
'
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Blackstone's law of private redress to the wrongs perpetrated by railroad owners,
11
automobile drivers, and product manufacturers."
But, as explained by Professor Goldberg, tort law began to encounter ridicule
12
and disrespect a few decades into the twentieth century. Tort scholars like
Fleming James and Albert Ehrenzweig "explicitly condemned tort" for its slowness
13
in according relief to accident victims and for its arbitrariness in deciding cases.
According to Goldberg, later scholars such as Mark Franklin and Jeffrey O'Connell
14
picked up this line of explicit dirision toward tort. Moreover, another group of
twentieth century tort scholars, led by Leon Green and William Prosser, exploited
tort law for the power and influence it could provide "armchair policymakers (law
15
professors)." As Goldberg described it, these tort gold-diggers did not "love[] tort
law f~r. w~at it is," but for ~ts "bl~ c~eck" Rropensio/ "to confer jurisdiction" ~d
6
to legttmuze "de novo 'soctal engmeenng. "' A promment contemporary explotter
17
of tort law, in Goldberg's view, is Judge Richard A. Posner. Contrasting Posner's
conservative exploitation of tort with the ideas of those whom he views as
contemporary liberal exploiters of tort, like Professors Thomas H. Koenig and
Michael..L. Rustad, Goldberg opined as follows:
If, for Koenig and Rustad, the great thing about tort is that it
pennits judges and juries to adopt the role of unappointed
corporate ombudsmen, for Posner the greatthing about tort is that
it pennits judges to act as roving efficiency commissioners
charged with the task of identifying and achieving the cost18
·
efficient mix of precaution and injury.
Professor Goldberg perceived other modern tort scholars like Richard Epstein
and Jules Coleman as unlovers of tort, at worst, and cool, detached proponents of
tort law, at best both refusing to embrace tort law for what it is instead of what it
might become, as refashioned to meet their own idiosyncratic philosophical
19
critiques. And, even Professor Ernest J. Weinrib, in Goldberg's view, while

ll. /d. (citingJohnC.P. Goldberg, TheLifeoftheLaw, 51 STAN.L.REv. 1419, 1455-74(1999)).
12. See id. at 1509-13.
13. /d. at 1509 (citing Priest, supra note 10, at 470-83).
14. /d.
15. /d. at 1510.
16. Goldberg, supra note I, at 1510-11 (quotingWILUAML.PROSSER,HANDBOOKOFTHELAW
OF TORTS§ 3, at 15 (1st ed. 1941)).
17. /d. at 1512.
18. /d. (footnote omitted). Goldberg's discussion of Koenig and Rustad focuses on their book:
Th:OMAS H. KOENIG& MICHAELL. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW (200 l ). According to Goldberg,
in reference to this book, "(p]erhaps a better title would have been The Political Usefulness of Tort
Law., Goldberg, supra note I, at 15 II n.41. In reference to Posner, Goldberg asserts that efficiency
as a primary Posnerian focus is "the clear implication of Posner's rejection of the idea that law and
moral principles constrain adjudication,.his corresponding overt embrace of open--ended, policy-based
judicial decisionmaking, and his belief that aggregate efficiency is, at a minimum, the prime policy
consideration to which he ... attends and should attend." /d. at 1512 n.45. For this author's view that
Judge Posner's judicial opinions (including some tort opinions) express a more nuanced, multi-faceted
judicial philosophy than mere efficiency and wealth-maximization, see Robert F. Blomquist, Dissent,
Posner-Style: Judge Richard A. Posner·s First Decade ofDissenting Opinions. 198J.. J991 Toward
an Aesthetics ofJudicial Dissenting Style, 69 Mo. L. REv. 73 (2004) or Robert F. Blomquist, Playing
on Words: Judge Richard A. Posner's Appellate Opinions, 1981-82 Ruminations on Sexy Judicial
Opinion Style During an Extraordinary Rookie Season, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 651 (2000).
19. See Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1513-1 5.
.

.

.
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20

saying that tort law is "'just like love, "' does not truly love tort law; if Weinrib
was a true lover of tort, he would have higher aspirations for his beloved instead of
being resigned, as Goldberg seemed to see W einrib, to fatalistically accepting the
content of modem tort law as an ingrained and unmalleable part of the human
21
practice and heritage of corrective justice.
Professor Goldberg trun1peted a call for those with a deep love for tort law-·---for
its content and for its power; for its substance as well as its fonn to offer up their
affection and future aspiration for tort. Although his call is magnetic, this Article
quibbles with both his critique of W einrib and his aspirational insistence on
doctrinal coherence for tort. In speaking up for tort law, on one level, this Article
sounds a bit schmaltzy like Ricky Ricardo, striking up his band to play the theme
song for the 1950s TV program, I Love Lucy. Yet, on another level, Goldberg's
article creates an irresistible challenge accepted in this Article the product of a
torts professor of eighteen years and a sometimes practitioner in the field to pick
up the gauntlet and join hi1n in an effort to defend and tore-enchant this beloved
subject.

***

The lusty mo·nth of May! I sit grading bluebooks in my Bahama blue-colored
study in my Fnmk Lloyd Wright- inspired 1915 condominium building in Oak Park,
Illinois, which I share with my wife. During moments like these (mostly
dispiriting), I often think I might be inclined to agree with the dismal assessment
made by the unlovers of tort identified by Professor Goldberg. Too many of my
students tend to throw in eve
· g-but-the-kitchen-sink-type arguments while
groping their way through their fmal torts examinations. When I read these
bluebooks, I wonder whether tort law really might be -as incoherent and unlovable
as some of the tort unlovers claim, either explicitly or implicitly. But occasionally,
I come upon a bluebook that identifies nuanced issues in the problems presented;
delineates key tort concepts, doctrines and principles that might help resolve the
issues; and boldly concludes its analysis with specific advice for a client or
arguments for a court. The latter, of course, merits the A in the course (and even the
course honors) since they portray the law of torts as modestly intelligible, socially
useful, and worthy of our affection.

***

The goal in this Article is to spark there-enchantment of tort for the twenty-frrst
century. Part II consists of a short but wide ranging discussion of a philosophical
model of love for tort law. As part of this rumination, this Article attempts to
diagnose the general cause for the tort unlovers' malaise, identified by Professor
Goldberg, as frrst being rooted in a misunderstanding of Ernest Weinrib's
conception of tort law as non-functional, private law. Thus, on this point, Professor
Goldberg might harbor a mild disapproval for the structure of tort law which,
hopefully, he will overcome. Then, to help tort unlovers better appreciate the
intrinsic attractiveness of tort, Part III delves into the robust aesthetics, both
functionalist and non-functionalist, of modem tort law. Finally, the goal in Part IV
is to explain why modem tort law is aesthetically worthy of being loved, even
though it has disappointed many scholars in certain respects.

20. ld. at 1501 (quoting ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THEIDEAOFPRIVATELAW 6 (1995)).
21. /d. at 1515-17.

•
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II. A STARTING POINT FOR A PHILOSOPHY OF LoVE FOR TORT LAW

A. On the General Nature ofLove and Disappointed Love for Tort Law

The object of the emotion love is a beloved. While humans are accustomed to
thinking of other persons as the potential objects of their love attractive by virtue
ofqualities such as beauty and goodness humans also come to love, or not to love,
non-human objects.. Thus, humans regularly consider loving concrete objects: for
example, a girl named Teresa, a guy named Jack, a sculpture by Picasso, a new
Ferrari, or a ·rose garden. But more rarely do humans consider loving abstract
objects: freedom, democracy, or education, for example.
As philosopher Sam Keen expressed in his book To Love and Be Loved,
"[c]lassical philosophers and theologians . . . insisted that love can thrive only in
22
combination with other virtues." "For the Buddha, compassion was necessarily
linked to wisdom. For Saint Paul, the trinity was faith, hope, and love. For Paul
23
Tillich, love, power, and justice stand or fall together."
Indeed, "[m]ost
premodern theories consider love to be an elixir that gradually dissolves the
boundaries we erect between the self and others and progressively drives the ego
beyond individualism, beyond the sanctuary of intimacy, into a more and more
24
inclusive conununity." On one hand, according to Keen, all "unhappy love
25
stories"-those involving disappointment and disillusionment "are all the same."
All unhappy love stories "exhibit the same endlessly repeated, boring pattern of
resentment, bickering, withholding, blame, disrespect, inattention, abuse, and so
27
26
on." On the other hand, happy love stories "are all creative and unique" and
"[w]hen we love, we live in a reenchanted world that is governed more by what may
yet happen than by what ·has already happened, by possibilities that lie beyond our
28
wildest imagination. "
Professor Goldberg has performed a grea.t service by describing how various
tort scholars of recent decades are really tellers of an unhappy love story about tort
law because tort law has disappointed them in its substantive payoff.. As Goldberg
9
indicated, these unlovers apparently resent tort because of its often ad hoc,~ policy30
driven ways of resolving disputes that sometimes "smack too much of crude
32
33
31
vengeance" and its tort stories that are "too grim [and] too preposterous."
More specifically, Goldberg explained that many tort scholars are jilted lovers of
tort who do not want to embrace modem tort law because, for them, it has "become
34
35
awkward for at least three reasons": (1) "we have asked too much of it"; (2)
•

22. SAM KEEN, To LOVE AND BE LoVED 15 (1997).
23. Jd.
24. Jd.
25. Id. at 17.
26. Jd.
27. /d.
28. KEEN, supra note 22, at 217.

29. See Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1518 n.63 (observing that "while the tort system can serve to
provide sporadic advances toward distributive justice, this sort of'ad hoc-ery' generates hostility not
only to tort (hence modetn tort refotm), but to the perceived beneficiaries of the system, i.e., the persons
who stand to benefit from a more above-the-board system of redistribution").
30. See infra notes 118-39 and accompanying text.
31. Goldberg, supra note l, at IS 17.
32. See infra notes 141-53 and accompanying text.
33. Goldberg, supra note 1, at IS 18.
34. Jd.
35. /d.
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"modem academics have tended to gauge tort on a set of rigged criteria"; and (3)
tort scholars "have sucked much of the law out of tort, leaving institutional actors,
partic~laz:~r)udges, with a diminished sense of professional self when confronting
tort suits.
In my attempt to amplify and build on Professor Goldberg's optimistic
manifesto of love for tort law, I contend that many scholarly unlovers of tort fail to
see the potential in modem tort law for are-enchanted law of torts because they are
locked into the discourse of telling an unhappy love story replete with blame,
disrespect, withholding, and abuse and because they fail to appreciate the essential
38
goodness, resilience, adaptabilitY and beauty of modem tort doctrine. For similar
reasons, I contend that unlovers of tort law fail to see the trajectory of modem tort
39
law and its promising future evolutionary possibilities.

B.

What Ernest Weinrib Really Meant

Professor Goldberg cited Professor Ernest W einrib for the proposition that
private law which includes contract, restitution, property, and tort is '"just like
40
love. '" According to Goldberg, what Weinrib meant by this cryptic comparison
is that "tort law is like love in that it cannot be understood by reference to its
purpose or function" and thus cannot be made intelligible by reference to "the social
41
functions it happens to perfor1n."
Goldberg claimed that "tort to Weinrib
resembles sport. The sports fan appreciates how the rules, practices, and
participants in a game like baseball or basketball come together to create a
distinctive enterprise," but the sports fan, like the lover, according to Goldberg,
42
"does not ask what is the point or purpose of the sport."
43
Recall Professor Weinrib's seminal 1995 book, ul!on which Professor
Goldberg relied to describe Weinrib as an unlover of tort. How did Professor
Weinrib really describe tort law? How did W einrib compare tort law to love? What
did Goldberg leave out of his description ofWeinrib 's analysis of tort law as a type
of private law?

1.

The Importance of Tort Law

Professor Goldberg failed to mention Professor Weinrib's view on the
importance of tort law as a key component along with property law, contract law,
45
and the law of restitution in what he tenns "private law." On the frrst page of
his book, Weinrib extolled the importance of private law as "a pervasive
phenomenon of our social life, a silent but ubiquitous participant in our most
46
common transactions":

36. !d.
37. /d.
3 8. See infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
40. Goldberg, supra note l, at 1501 (quoting ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 6
(1995)).
41. /d. at 1502.
42. /d.
43. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IbEAOF PRIVATE LAW (1995).
44. See generally Goldberg, supra note l, at 1502 (discussing how W einreib, by stating "that tort
is just like love," actually detnonstrates that tort is unloved).
45. See WEINRIB, supra note 43, at 1.
46. /d.
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[Private law] is the public repository of our most deeply
embedded intuitions about justice and personal responsibility.
Private law is also among the frrst subjects that prospective
lawyers study. Its position in law school curricula indicates the
consensus of law teachers that private law is the most elementary
manifestation oflaw, its reasoning paradigmatic oflegal thinking,
and i~ c'?nc~ts presupposed in more complex fonns of legal
organtzatton.

Based on this thesis, then, Weinrib would not be inclined as GoldberR
contended he would to equate ''love'' of sport with love of a beloved inamorato. ·
Tort law for Weinrib is different in kind from mere sport; to hint tort law is, like a
romantic lover, of the highest importance worthy of total cununitment
2.

The Non-Functional Aesthetic Value ofTort Law

Professor Goldberg did not give enough attention to Professor Weinrib's
contrarian, non-functionalist view of tort law as a component ofprivate law. While
49
Goldberg alluded to Weinrib 's "idea of the internal intelligibility" of tozt law as
a species ofprivate law,so Goldberg's explanation oversimplifies the nuanced points
that Weinrib made about the intrinsic aesthetic beauty of private law in general, and
tort law in particular. Moreover, Weinrib 's account is richer than Goldberg implied.
Based on Weinrib 's view, tort law (along with property law, unjust enrichment law,
and contract law) is worthy of love because, as private law, it: (a) is "an autonomous
52
51
body of leaming," {b) is distinct from politics, ( c consists of key concepts that
from the realm of public law.

54

Weinrib explained this idea more fully:

In asserting that the sole purpose of private law is to be

private law, I aim to undenttine [functionalist] assumptions.
I ... argue that private law construes the litigating parties as
irnmediately connected to each other. Interaction so conceived is
categorically distinct from that of public law, which relates
persons only indirectlythrough the collective goals detennined by
state authority. The different mechanisms for enunciating legal
norms adjudication and legislation-broadly reflect the different
contours of these two modes of interaction. The autonomy· of
private law as a body of learning is a consequence of the
distinctiveness of private law as a mode of interaction. To
understand private law, we must take seriously its fundamental
concepts, which, far from being surrogates for the operation of
independently justifiable collective purposes, are the juridical
markers of the inunediate cormection between the parties.

47. /d.
48. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
49. WEINRIB~ supra note 43., at 6.
SO. Goldberg, supra note l, at 1502...
51. WEINRIB, supra note 43., at 6.
52. Id. at7.
53. /d.
54. Jd.
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Understood in this way, private law is a juridical, not a political,
phenomenon. By thus jettisoning the functionalist assumptions
we can return to the idea that private law is to be understood from
Wl"thin•ss

Moreover, Professor Weinrib's account of tort law as a critical component of
6
private law -under-appreciated in Professor Goldberg's synopsis focuses on tort
law's aesthetic attractiveness and three-part, mutually-reinforcin~ internal
7
coherence: (a) the "immanently intelligible" theoretical fratnework, (b) the
"Aristotle[an] conception of corrective justice as the unifying structure that renders
58
private law relationships immanently intelligible," and (c) the "nonnative force"
59
of the corrective justice paradigm.

3.

The Praiseworthy Bipolarity of Tort Law's Proper Focus on
Corrective Justice

Professor Goldberg misunderstood Professor Weinrib 's discussion ofcorrective
justice in tort law as a tribal "fidelity to 'our' tort law" that is "powerful, almost

55. /d. at 8.

56. Weinrib placed particular entphasis on ''the treatment of accidental injuries in the common
law of torts," in explicating his theory of private law. /d. at 20. Weinrib did this 'f[b]ecause the
negligent defendant's culpability seems morally detachable from the fortuity of injury, liability for
negligence poses a particularly severe challenge to the stringent notion of coherence" he claimed exists
in private Jaw. WEINRIB, supro note 43, at 20. Accordingly, Weinrib argued that "[i]f fonnalisrn
illuminates negligence law, it presumably illuminates less problematic bases of liability as well,, id.,
such as liability for breach of contract or unjust enrichment.
51. /d. at 18. Weinrib fully described the theoretical framework:
The first thesis concerns the theoretical framework. An internal account of
private law sets in opposition to contemporary functionalism the thesis that
private law is immanently intelligible. Building on the jurist's understanding of
private law as a distinctive and coherent ensemble of characteristic features, the
thesis integrates the distinctiveness, the coherence, and the character of private
law into a single theoretical approach. Underlying this integration is the notion
that one understands a legal relationship through its unifying structure, or "fom1."
Applied to private law, the thesis of immanent intelligibility is a version of legal
formalism.
/d.

58. Id. at 19. Weinrib contended that his second thesis "identifies Aristotle's conception of
corrective justice as the unifying structure that renders private law relationships inunanently
intelligible":
Corrective justice is the pattern of justificatory coherence latent in the bipolar
private law relationship ofplaintiffto defendant. By abstractly schematizing this
pattern, Aristotle made manifest the distinctive rationality ofprivate Jaw. And by
decisively distinguishing corrective from distributive justice, Aristotle established
the categorical difference between private law and other legal orderings.
/d.

!d.

59. WEINRIB, supra note 43, at t 9. Weinrib described his third thesis:
The third thesis concerns the nonnativeness ofcorrective justice. Corrective
justice is the justificatory structure that pertains to the immediate intetaction of
one free being with another. Its nonnative force derives from Kant's concept of
right as the governing idea for relationships between free beings. For Kant,
freedom itself implies juridical obligation. On this view, the doctrines, concepts,
and institutions of private law are nonnative inasmuch as they make a legal
reality out of relations of corrective justice.

2005]
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moving," but ''is not love precisely because of its fatalistic undertones. " Goldberg
was mistaken when he argued the following:
Weinrib says that we must attend to correctivejustice because we
are who we are.; we can do no other. In so saying, he fails to
capture the ineliminable aspirational aspect of love. One cannot
love something that one does not respect, admire, or embrace,. at
least a little bit. A person or thing must contain at least a shadow
or flickering of the good before·it can become the object of our
61
affection. It is not enough that he, she, or it is simply ours.
As explained above, Weinrib admired and embraced the internal coherence of
62

tort law as an aspect of private law. The focal point ofWeinrib's enthusiastic
love for tort law is tort law's doctrinal requirement for a bipolar linking ofthe tort
claimant with the tort defendant, as exemplified by negligence law, to "consider the
63
entitlement ofthis particular plaintiffto reparation from this particular defendant. "
Indeed, Weinrib' s theoretical description of modem negligence law contains much
64
more than ~'a shadow or flickering of the good," according to Goldberg. Weinrib
6
beamed with Newtonian exuberance s about the internal dynamics of negligence
law:
[C]orrective justice is immanent in the most fundamental concepts
of negligence law. By tracing different aspects of the progression
from the doing to the suffering of harm, these concepts coalesc_e
into a single normative sequence and thus instantiate corrective
justice. Throughout, negligence law treats the plaintiff and the
defendant as correlative to each other: the significance of doing
lies in the possibility of causing someone to suffer, and the
significance of suffering lies in its being the consequence of
someone else's doing. Central to the linkage of plaintiff and
defendant is the idea of risk, for "risk imports relation." The
sequence starts with the potential for hann inherent in the
defendant's wrongful act (hence-the standard ofreasonable care)
and concludes with the realization of that potential in the
plaintiffs injury (hence the role- of misfeasance and factual
causation). The concepts ofduty of care and proximate cause link
the- defendant's action to the plaintiffs suffering through
judgments about the generality of the description of the action's
potential consequences. Each of the negligence concepts traces
an actual or potential connection between doing and suffering,
and together they translate into juridical terms the-movement of
effects from the doer to the sufferer. In this way the negligence
60. Goldberg, supra note_1, at 1517. ·
61. /d.
62. See supra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
63. WEINRIB,supra note 43, at 170; see also id. at 63-66 (discussing the bipolarity of corrective
negligence law).
64. Goldberg, supra note I, at 1S17.
65. See generally JAMES GLEICK, ISAAC NEWTON (2003) (examining the life and unpublished
writings of Sir Isaac Newton, British scientist and philosopher who devoted his life to the study of
physics, optics, and calculus and whose work, most prominently his three laws of motion,
revolutionized scientific thought in the seventeenth century).
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concepts form an ensemble that brackets and articulates a single
66
normative sequence.
67

Weinrib criticized some aspects of modem strict liability tort doctrine. But
Weinrib concluded with a lover's lament that "the theoretical case for basing tort
liability on the causation ofhann without fault is inconsistent with the equality and
correlativity of corrective justice and with the concept of agency that underlies
68
Kantian right." Moreover, Weinrib thought it a good thing that four tort doctrines
69
associated with strict liability "do not exemplify liability on causation alone. "
Indeed, "[1] [r]espondant superior and [2] liability for abnormal~ dangerous
activities can be understood as extending the operation of fault," while "[3]
nuisance law and [4] the incomplete privilege regarding the preservation ofprope!JX
1
embody corrective justice in the relationship of one property owner to another."
ill. A ROBUST AESTHETICS OF MODERN AMERICAN TORT LAW
A. Pierre Schlag's Aesthetics ofAmerican Law

Professor Pierre Schlag made an apt observation in his landmark 2002 article,
12
The Aesthetics of American Law : "Law is an aesthetic enterprise. Before the
ethical dreams and political ambitions of law can even be articulated, let alone
realized, the aesthetics of law have already shaped the medium within which those
13
projects will have to do their work." Schlag broke new ground ·in his article by
arguing for what might be called a robust aesthetics of American law. Moving
beyond what he characterized as "a conventional understanding of aesthetics as the
74
province of beauty and fme art," leading to "a moral idealization of aesthetics or
75
a romanticization of law (or both)," Schlag based his project on articulating a
"description of those recurrent forms that shape the creation, apprehension, and
76
identity of the law."
Professor Schlag's aesthetically robust descriptive scheme of American law
clarifies the multiple (and often unruly) dimensions of modern American tort law
and encourages better appreciation of Ernest Weinrib's more limited, traditional
77
aesthetic of tort law. From this enhanced comprehension, perhaps, some scholars

66. WEINRIB, supra note 43, at 168-69 (footnote omitted) (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928)).
67. See id. at 171-203.
68. /d. at 203.
69. !d.
70. /d.
71. /d.
72. Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics ofAmerican Law, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1049 (2002).
73. /d. at 1049.
74. /d. at 1050.
75. /d. at I OS 1.
76. /d.
77. See supra notes 40-71 and accompanying text. Indeed, Weinrib 's conception of tort law as

a non-functional body of law resetnbles the art theory doctrine of aestheticism, which postulates "that
art should be valued for itself alone and not for any purpose or function it may happen to serve"; thus,
this "idea of art for art's sake is associated with a cult of beauty, which had its roots in K.antian
aesthetics and the Romantic movetnent, although its potential application is wider than that." A
COMPANION TO AESTHETICS 6 (David Cooper ed., 1992).
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and lawyers can as discussed below actually come to love modem American tort
78
law with its many (functional and non-functional) layers of complexity.
Schlag provided,a four-part aesthetic of American law: (1) a grid aesthetic, (2
Before describing these four aesthetics in the context of American tort law, this
Article will set forth Professor Schlag's general theories abo·ut them. First, the grid
aesthetic pictures law as follows:
[The grid is a] two-dimensional area divided into contiguous,
well-bounded legal spaces. These spaces are divided into
doctrines, rules, and the like. Those doctrines, rules, and the like
are further divided into elements, and so on and so forth. The
subjects, doctrines, elements, and the like are cast as "objectforms." They exhibit the characteristic features of objects:
boundedness, ftxity, and substantiality. They have insides and
outsides that are separated by well-marked boundaries. The
resulting structure· -the grid feels solid, sound, determinate.
Law is etched in stone. The grid aesthetic is the aesthetic of
bright-line rules, absolutist approaches, and categorical
80
defmitions.
Second, in the Schlagian energy aesthetic, "law is cast in the image of energy.
Conflicting forces of principle, policy, values, and politics collide and combine in
81
sundryways." Moreover; "[p]recedents expand or contract in accordance with the
push and pull of policy and principle. Legal rules, principles~ policies, and values
have magnitudes that must be quantified, measured, and compared. Movement and
82
flux are the orders of the day." Third, with the perspectivist aesthetic Schlag
theorized the following:
the identities of law and laws mutate in relation to point of view.
As the frame, context, perspective, or position of the actor or
observer shifts, both fact and law come to have different identities.
Accordingly, the social or political identity of the legal actor or
83
observer becomes the crucial situs of law and legal inquiry.
Finally; according to Schlag, the dissociative aesthetic plays the role of trickster in
law:
[As] identities collapse into each other. Nothing is what it is, but
is always already something else. Any attempt to refer to X is

frustrated, as even the most minimal inquiry reveals that X is an
unstable glonuning-on of many other things that cannot be
subsumed or stabilized within any one thing. The crucial
contributions of the prior aesthetics the grid (and its ftxed
identities), energy (and its quantifiable magnitudes), and

78. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
79. Schlag, supra note 72, at 1051 ~52.
80. /d. at 1051.
81. /d.
82. /d. at 1051-52.
83. /d. at 1052.
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perspective (and its identifiable relations)-have all collapsed.
84
No deterntinable identities, relations, or perspectives survive.
Professor Schlag's theory of a robust aesthetics of American law provides an
exciting sprin~board for a rreliminary sketch (or painting) of the aesthetics of
8
modem Amencan tort law. ·
B. Tort Law Aesthetics
1.

Grid Aesthetics

Modem tort law has three key axes: intentional torts, negligent torts, and strict
liability torts. Interspersed along these three axes are an assortinent ofspecific torts,
including battery, false imprisonment, and conversion (plotted off the intentional
axis); common law negligence, statutorily-rooted negligence per se, and medical
malpractice (extended off the negligence axis); and defective products liability,
abnormally dangerous activity liability, and respondeat superior (charted off the
strict liability axis).
Imagine this plotting experiment as taking place on reticulated graph paper (the
kind of paper one might have used in a high school geometry class). Each of the
discrete torts (for example, battery from the intentional tort axis) can be represented
as a rather large rectangular figure made of many smaller rectangles on the graph
paper, although the area of each rectangle will vary depending upon the relative
complexity of each substantive tort and its subsumed doctrines and principles.
Imagine taking out a.box of crayons and boldly outlining each tort rectangle with
a distinct color. Consider the following thought experiment If battery were a
color, for example, it would.be cardinal red. As explained by Victoria Finlay in her
86
wonderful book Color: A Natural History of The Palette: "In our modem
language ~f. metaphors, red is an~~r, it is frre it is the sto~y feelings of the
81
heart, ... It IS the god of war, and tt ts power." Assault, while close to battery's
emotive sensibility, would be tropical fish orange, a color more attuned to the
mental feature of a potential harmful or offensive touching, the apprehension of
blows yet-to-come. "Orange is a warning color dangerous parts .of machinery are
deliberately painted with it, the theory being that it is the most eye-catching color
84. !d. Schlag asserted that, while these four aesthetics of American law are not "exhaustive of
the aesthetics that can be discerned in American law,, they are, in his opinion, "the most important."
•

Schlag, supra note 72, at 1052 n.l3 .
85. Schlag pr-Ovided a rich description of his aesthetics project for American law. See id. at
I 052-54. One of his more important general insights is as follows:
These aesthetics are "legal," not in the sense that they are exclusive to law (they
are not). Rather, they are legal in the sense that they are instanced in the
traditional legal materials, the usual canonical texts, sites, and scenes of law:
appellate opinions, rules, doctrines, and the like. They are integrated aesthetics
in the weak sense that each is a prototypical coalescence of:
Images and schemas,
Rhetorical forms,
Metaphors and other tropes,
Perceptual modes and sensibilities,
Dramatic tensions,
Sensory impressions, and
Emotions and feelings.
/d. at 1052-53 {footnotes omitted).
86. VICTORIA FINLAY, COLOR: A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE PAl .ETIE (2002).

87. !d. at 142.
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and people will see it and jump out of the way." Ochre (iron oxide) would border
the rectangle of trespass to land and perhaps the rectangle of its close relation
trespass to chattels because these torts are among the oldest and most familiar, and
they bespeak a Paleolithic connection with the earth and objects made from the
earth. Indeed, these torts resonate with the ancient vintage color of ochre, which
89
was "the first color paint." Finlay explained this color's importance:
[Ochre] has been used on every inhabited continent since painting
began, and it has been around ever since, on the palettes of almost
every artist in history. In classical times the best of it came from
the Black Sea city of Sinope, in the area that is now Turkey, and
was so valuable that the paint was stamped with a special
seal . . . . The ftrSt white settlers in North America called the
indigenous people "Red Indians" because of the way they painted
themselves with ochre (as a shield against evil, symbolizing the
good elements of the world, or as protection against the cold in
winter and insects in sumn1er), while in Swaziland's Bomvu
Ridge ... archaeologists have discovered mines that were used at
least forty thousand years ago to excavate red and yellow
pigments for body painting. The word "ochre" comes from the
Greek meaning "pale yellow," but somewhere along the way the
word shifted to suggest something more robust something
redder or browner or earthier. Now it can be used loosely to refer
to almost any natural earthy pigment, although it most accurate~
describes earth that contains a measure of hematite, or iron ore.
The common law tort of negligence a largely nineteenth century invention
that has evolved into a law and economics utilitarian, risk-balancing
91
92
would be sky blue, the color of clarity and cool calculation. The
calculus
perimeter of the adjacent rectangle on the graph paper symbolizing the statutorilyinspired tort of negligence per se would be colored cobalt blue (a more directive and
93
insistent hue than sky blue).
In the various strict liability tort boxes on our grid-chart, the vicarious-based
tort of respondeat superior would be charcoal black because black is a derivative
94
color from the absorption of other colors. By way of contrast, a yellow border

88.
89.
90.
91.

!d. at 195.
!d. at 26.
!d. at 26-27 (endnotes omitted).
For an early case applying the reasonable person standard of negligence law, see Vaughan
v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837). The classic negligence law risk-balancing test was crafted
by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
92. See FINLAY, supra note 86, at 304 (describing how John Tyndall, nineteenth century British
scientist, stated that he thought best while walking in the mountains, enjoying the clarity of the sky).
93. Finlay described origins of cobalt:
[C]obalt had been used in paint for years, but in its purer forrn it didn't reach
European paint boxes until the nineteenth century, when a scientist called LouisJacques Thenard managed to make it into a pigment. Ifhe had been living today,
Michelangelo would have liked this blue best. It is expensive, and leans toward
violet. It was the Persians who really first found how good cobalt was a
glaze they used it for the blue tiles of their mosques ....
!d. at 296-97. The Ming-era Chinese "coveted" cobalt and used it as a glaze on exquisitely refined
pottery. /d. at 297.
94. /d. at 71.
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would surround the tort of abnonnally dangerous activity liability because of the
ambiguity of the balancing factors used in determining ~hether an activity is
95
abnormally dangerous and the resemblance ofsome ofthese factors to negligence96
like risk-utility analysis. Like the tort of strict liability for abnonnally dangerous
97
activity, of all the colors, "'yellow gives some of the most mixed messages of alt"
Thus, yellow
is the color of pulsating life of com and gold and angelic
haloes and it is also at the same time a color of bile, and in its
sulphurous incarnation it is the color of the Devil. In animal life,
yellow especially mixed with black is a warning. Don't come
near, it conunands, or you will be stung or poisoned or generally
inconvenienced. In Asia yellow is the color of power .,....the
emperors of China were the only ones allowed to sport sunshinecolored robes. But it is also the color of declining power. A
sallow complexion comes with sickness; the yellow of leaves in
autumn not only symbolizes their death, it indicates it. The
change shows that the leaves are not absorbing the s.ame light
energy that they used to take in when they were ,green and full of
chloronhyll. It shows they no longer have what it takes to nourish
them. 9~

In considering the more specific doctrines, rules, tests, and even the more
99
specific elements associated with each discrete tort, it would be interesting to
attempt to imitate the artistic enterprise of artists like Piet Mondrian. Consider the
common law tort of negligence, for example. To refme and subdivide the sky blue
100
rectangle symbolizing the tort, the "experimenter" might aesthetically depict the
characteristics of negligent conduct on the grid of tort law by assorted re.ctangles
within rectangles, each with differing shapes and areas. In this regard, first of all,
an image of Mondrian's 1942 canvas entitled New York City I comes to mind: a
painting of "primary colors yellow, but also red and blue [that] traverse the
101
square canvas, interweaving with each other." Mondrian's numerous, different95. ~ee REST~TEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-20 ( 1977) (utilizing terms such as "common
usage," "tnappropnateness," and "value").
96. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS §§ 292-93 (1965) (outlining factors thetrieroffact
should consider in detennining the utility and the risk of an actor's conduct).
97. FINLAY, supra note ,86, at 203.
98. /d.
99. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
10 l. HANS L.C. JAFFE, PIET MONDRIAN 122-23 (1985) [hereinafter MONDRIAN]. See Figure 1
·
below.

Figure 1: Piet Mondrian's
New YQrk City I
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sized and shaped rectangles-within-rectangles vividly convey the structure of the
assorted characteristics of negligent conduct within the common law tort of
negligence, even though Mondrian's primary color scheme in this work might not
accurately depict the emotive force of the specific characteristics of the common
102
law tort of negligence.
Thus, for instance, the objective test of a defendant's
conduct in a connnon law negligence action whether the defendant's conduct
103
confonned to the conduct of a hypothetical "reasonable man'' ·... --is nicely depicted
in Mondrian's New York City I by one of the larger rectangles running around the
perimeter of his canvas; the objective test is an important concept and serves to
explain many of the more specific_aspects of the corrunon law tort of negligence
which smaller rectangles within those larger rectangles might represent. The
aspects might include, for example, the knowledge, experience, and perception
which a reasonably prudent person would have perceived under the circumstances
104
as well as those things which a reasonable person knows about the community.
Take a second example: the tort of battery. A second grid~aesthetic example
seems appropriate: Mondrian' s more basic 1936 canvas, Composition With Red and
Black, consisting of''an enclosed square" that is "further subdivided and enlivened
by" horizontal lines; the "squares are brought together into larger units or, if you
105
will, in which larger squares are divided up into [a few] smaller units." Again,
putting aside Mondrian's specific palette choices in this painting (which we might
want to modify to show the emotive force of specific characteristics of this
106
intentional tort), Mondrian's minimalist, subdivided rectangles convey the
structure ofthe spare elements and the associated doctrines ofthe tort ofbattery: the
two manifestations of intent, which include a defendant's desire to cause a hannful
or offensive contact with the plaintiff or the plaintiffs apprehension of imminent
contact, or defendant's knowledge that the consequences are substantially certain
107
to result from defendant's conduct; the concept of the plaintiffs -"person"
including those things in contact with it or closely connected and identified with
108
it; · the rule that the plaintiff need not be aware of the defendant's contact at the

102. See supra notes 86--98 and accompanying text.
103. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS § 283 (1965).
104~ !d. §§ 289~90.
.
.
105. MONDRIAN,supra note 101, at 116-17. See Figure 2, below.

Figure 2: Piet Mandrian's
Composition with Red and
Black
106~

See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
107. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS §§SA, 13, 14, 16, 18,20 (1965).
108. ld. § 18 cmt. c.
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110

the definition of harmful contact and the more expansive definition of
111
offensive contact; and various privileges, or defenses, to battery such as
113
112
114
consent, self-defense, defense of others, and the like.

time;

For more esoteric torts like negligent infliction of emotional distress,
defamation, and invasion ofprivacy, for example the rectilinear limitations of the
grid aesthetic in conveying the complexity and nuances of assorted doctrines and
definitions and rules tempts consideration of artists like Vasily Kandinsky (in
115
particular his final, "biomorphic" phase). Indeed, Kandinsky' s 1936 Composition
IX, with its "superimposed planes" and "hard-edged, diagonal stripes" and "floating
116
rectangles, squares, and several circles at both ends/' captures the multiple
117
dimensions of these three complex torts. Thus, utilizing complex imagery like

109. !d. § 18 cmt. d.
110. I d. § 15. Hannful contact is actionable if it produces bodily hann. This includes any physical
damage, however slight, to any part of the plaintiffs body (sqch as a cut or a bruise) or even so-called
"beneficial'' contacts (like plastic surgery). !d. § 15 cmt. a.
111. Jd. § 19. An offensive contact is one which "offends a reasonable sense of personal
dignity." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF.TORTS § 19 (1965).
112-. See id. §§ 49-62,167-75, 252-56; RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS §§ 892, 89ZA-892D
(1979).
113. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS §§ 63-68,261 (1965).
114. See id. §§ 76, 156.
115. See THOMAS M. MESSER, VASILY KANDINSKY (James Leggio ed., 1997) [hereinafter
KANDINSKY]. According to Messer, Kandinsk:y's art is characterized by three distinct phases:
In this first phase, with its ever more intense expressivity, the emerging
distinction between a kind ofpainting that has gradually stripped itselfofmimetic
vestiges and one that has embraced, from the outset, a non-objective mode,
becomes incre~singly significant. In Kandinsky' s subsequent development,
roughly from the early 1920s to the early 1930s the figurative element was
virtually excluded, and pictorial content was conveyed through quasi-geometic
means. The expressive component of painting was reduced in favor of rational
construction. The artist's final major phase, in the last ten years of his life,
revealed a painter largely freed from dogmatic prescriptions and capable therefore
ofresponding to fresh stimuli. He found inspirationfor a new kind ofbiomorphic
form that allowed him to strike a balance between the objective and the nonobjective, the expressive and the rational.
/d. at 8-10 (emphasis added).
116. /d. at 118._19. See Figure 3 below.

117. First; the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress has special rules for bystanders
and direct victims, with various proximate cause limitations to limit emotional distress recovery. See
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS § 905 (1979); RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS§§ 306,312,313,
436, 436A, 456 (1965). Second, the tort of defamation is characterized by multiple rules for what is
defamatory, the degree of fault a plaintiff~ust show on the part of the defendant in knowing or failing
to ascertain the falsity of a statement, and the need for proof of special damages for some defamatory
statements versus special damages rules being "actionable per se" for other defamatory statements. See
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORJ'S §§ 558--623 (1977). Third, thetortofinvasionofprivacy, as it has
developed in the caselaw to date, involves separate rules and doctrines for four distinct wrongs: (1)
appropriation of one's name or likeness; (2) intrusion upon another's privacy or private affairs; (3)
public disclosure of private facts about the plaintiff and (4) placing the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye. See id. §§ 652A-652E.
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paintings by Mondrian and Kandinsky might enable the experimenter to portray the
linear dimensions of tort law on the grid. But the complexities of modem tort law
yield vital insight by shifting the experiment to the energy aesthetic.

2.

Energy Aesthetics

Modem tort law is also characterized by constantly shifting forces of policy,
values, and principles that coalesce and then recombine in endless ways. The
numerous policies that press and pull on tort doctrine, rules, and outcomes bracingly
118
illustrate the multiple force fields of tort law. One current torts casebook, for
example, articulates a dozen separate policies for modem tort law:
119

1. "Liability should be based on 'fault.'"
120
2. "Liability should be proportional to fault."
121
3. "Liability should be used to deter accidents."
122
4. "The costs of accidents should be spread broadly."

118. VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW (2d ed. 1999).
119. /d. at 7.
•

The fault principle has been strongly influential for more than a century, and it
accounts for much of the Jaw of negligence, and other tort rules as well. In part,
it is intended to allow individuals a maximum sphere of action free of the risk of
tort liability. According to the fault principle, only where the defendant's conduct
is blameworthy should liability be imposed. In general, the term "fault" is used
in torts to encompass situations where hann is the product of intentionally
tortious conduct or failure to exercise care.

/d.
120. /d.

The proportionality principle seeks to limit or refine application of the fault
principle. In part, it holds that liability should not be levied on an individual
tortfeasor, even if fault is shown, if doing so would expose the defendant to a
burden that is disproportionately heavy or perhaps unlimited. In addition, the
principle of proportionality holds that where the tortious conduct of two or more
persons contributes to the production of hann, liability for the loss should be
allocated among the actors in accordance with the degree to which their conduct
has precipitated the damage.
/d.
121. /d.

The detert ence principle recognizes that tort law is concerned not only with fairly
allocating past losses, but also with minimizing the costs of future accidents.
According to this principle, tort rules should discourage persons from engaging
in those forms of conduct which pose an excessive risk of personal injury or
property damage. In some cases, this means nothing more than that liability
should be imposed on those who deliberately inflict injury or cause hattn by
ignoring foreseeable risks. In other situations, such as those where a risk ofharm
is equally foreseeable to more than one person, the policy of deterrence favors
placing the threat of liability on the party best situated to avoid the loss, or, as
some might say, the cheapest cost avoider.
JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 118, at 7.
122. Id.
The idea underlying the "spreading" rationale is that the financial burden of
accidents may be diminished by spreading losses broadly so that no person is
forced to bear a large share of the damages. For example, some argue that when
a defective product unforeseeably causes injury to a consumer, it is best to place
the loss on the manufacturer, even in the absence of fault, for unlike the
unfortunate consumer, the manufacturer can distribute the loss to a large segment
of the public by incrementally adjusting the price of its products. Losses can be
spread not only through increases in the costs of goods and services, but through
other devices such as taxation and insurance. Though controversial, the spreading
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- S. "The costs of accidents should be shifted to those best able to
123
bear them."
6. "Those who benefit from dangerous activities should bear
124
resulting losses."
125
7. "Tort law should foster predictability in human affairs."
8. "Tort law should facilitate economic growth and the pursuit
of progress.u 126

"Tort law should be administratively convenient and efficient,
127
and should avoid intractable inquiries."
128
10. "Tort law should discourage the waste ofresources."
11. "Courts should accord due deference to co-equal branches of
129
govellUllent."
130
12. "Accident victims should be fully compensated."

9.

principle, in recent years, has revolutionized the law of products liability and has
catalyzed other changes in tort doctrine.
!d.

123. /d.
Although this principle is not concerned with identifying which persons are in a
good position to spread liability, the "shifting" rationale is closely related to the
spreading principle insofar as it seeks to use the process of loss allocation to
minimize the economic burden of accidents. According to this view, a loss will
be less severely felt if it is placed on one with substantial resources than on one
with limited wealth, and therefore losses should be shifted to those financially
able to bear them. Proponents of this view argue, for example, that it is
undesirable to force an accident victim with only $100 in assets to bear the full
amount of a $100 loss, for doing so means than [sic] the accident will have a
devastating financial impact. In contrast, shifting the same loss to a defendant
with a million dollars in assets may be desirable, for then the loss will not really
be felt by either the plaintiff or the defendant. To be sure, the law has never held
that a poor person should always be able to recover from a_rich one, or that a
wealthy person is precluded from seeking damages from one financially less well
to do. Indeed, in many quarters, there is great reluctance to applying one l~w to
the rich ·and another to the poor. Yet, the shifting rationale- sometimes
pejoratively referred to as the search for the "deep pockets, has not been
without influence. However, its impact on tort doctrine has been less overt than
the impact of many other policy considerations.
Id. at 7-8.
124. Id. at 8.
125. JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 118, at 8.
126. /d.

127. /d.
Only a limited amountofresources can be devoted to the administration ofjustice

in any society. This principle holds that tort rules should be shaped so that the
dollars spent on accident compensation are efficiently employed. Thus, legal
standards should not be so complex or uncertain that their application entails an
undue expenditure ofjudicial resources or imposes unnecessarily high litigation
costs on parties. So, too, convenience and efficiency discourage the pursuit of
what might be called intractable inquiries, matters where the facts are such that
even after expenditure of considerable time and money, there is a substantial risk
that an erroneous result will be reached.
!d.
128. /d.
129. /d.
130. JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 118, at 8.

There is a strong public interest in insuring that accident victims obtain the
financial resources needed to overcome the injuries they have sustained.
Proponents of this view argue that tort rules should be crafted and applied with
an eye toward this goal, even if that means diminished respect for the fault or
proportionality principles or other tort policies. A corollary to the compensation
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The push and pull of these tort policies are "sometimes antagonistic."
By
way of illustration, "[a]dherence to the fault principle may mean that an actor will
not be held liable for an unforeseeable injury, but also that the victim of that
132
accident will not be compensated." But this is not always the case:
[I]t is often possible for a decision on issues of accident
compensation to advance more than one tort goal. For example,
a court may hold that a driver who causes an auto accident by
exceeding the prescribed speed limit is liable to an injured
pedestrian for all resulting damages. In that case, it may be said
that the decision bases liability on fault (because the conduct was
unreasonable and the harm was foreseeable), deters future
accidents by this driver or others (by showing that violators will
be held liable), fully compensates the victim (by imposing liability
for resulting damages), embraces a predictable standard (namely
the posted speed limit), and defers to the legislature's judgment as
to the maximum reasonable speed on the road (by holding that
133
violation of the speed limit constitutes actionable negligence).
These competing and sometimes complementary policies of modem tort law
bring to mind orreries the clockwork, astronomical apparatuses of eighteenth
century natural philosophers. These orreries depicted the various planets of our
solar system, along with their various moons, moving in ftxed orbits that
34
In a related way, modem tort law's
occasionally align with other planets!
seemingly chaotic policies may be better envisioned as akin to the free-form
sculptural works created by Alexander Calder, which came to be labeled "mobiles''
135
by fellow artist Marcel Duchamp. Calder's 1956 mobile, Red Lily Pads, owned
by the Guggenheim museums; is apropos in representing the potential multifarious
juxtapositions and energy tensions among various tort policies in influencing
136
jurisprudential outcomes and in shaping doctrine, rules, and principles. Reading
the following description of Calder's mobile sculptures encourages better
appreciation of those policies of modem tort law, such as the fault, deterrence, or
137
full compensation principles which, like Calder's art, can be experienced as
"anthropomorphic metaphorS":

principle is the argument that a system which awards compensation on a regular,
predictable, and consistent basis is preferable to one in which doctrinal and
administrative vicissitudes render the availability of compensation a matter of
chance.
/d.

131. ld.
132. ld.
133. ld.
134. See generally I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: SCIENCE IN TilE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEFFERSON, FRANKUN, ADAMS, AND MADISON 80-86 (1995) (describing

various orreries admired by Thomas Jefferson, and explaining that the first orreries were constructed
in London in 1713 and showed only the motions of the Earth and Moon, but by mid-century orreries
displayed the orbital motions of planets and their satellites).
135. GUGGENHEIM MUSEUM: A TO Z 59 (Nancy Spector ed., 1992) [hereinafter GUGGENHEIM
COLLECTION].

136. See id. at 58-59.
137. See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra notes 119-30 and accompanying text.
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[The mobile] is now a vernacular art fottn, but when Calder
invented it the mobile was viewed as an avante-garde
achievement, a sculptural counterpart to Joan Mir6's paintings of
buoyant, biomorphic figures and Jean Arp's abstract reliefs.
Although they are nonfigurative, Calder's hanging mobiles,
particularly the monumental yet delicate Red Lily Pads, retain
references to the natural world: the dancing and spinning of the
disks evoke the intangible qualities of the air that propels them.
According to art historian Rosalind Krauss, the mobiles as
interconnected vertical structures in space create a sense of
volume analogous to that of the human body. In their surrender
to the pull of gravity and their displacement of space through
138
motion, the mobiles become anthropomorphic metaphors.
Alternatively, meditation on Brancusi's wooden sculptures (such as Adam and
Eve, The Sorceress, and King ofKings), the dynamic interaction of various shaped
spheres, hollowed-out cubes, blocks, and curvilinear forms spark recognition of the
139
charged energy field of modem tort policies.
140
The grid aesthetic and the energy aesthetic can deepen understanding of the
structure of modem tort law and the interacting forces affecting modem tort law.
But a transition to the perspectivist aesthetic is necessary to put human faces on
modem tort disputes.
3.

Perspectivist Aesthetics

What are the various ftmnes ofreference, contexts, or perspectives of the actors
or observers in tort cases? What are their social identities? Their political
identities? The perspectivist aesthetic allows commentators to move from
consideration of tort grids and tort energies to consider what one recent book refers
141
to as "torts stories":
Behind each notable case are a host of concerns and
considerations that are hidden even from the discerning eye,
focused as it is on the court's selective recitation of the facts and
its characterization of the issues and arguments presented to it.
Often, much more can be learned from digging beneath the
surface to find out more about the parties, the events giving rise
to the claimed injury, and the corresponding context of socioeconomic circumstances in which the case arose. And then the
lawyers enter the picture. How did they perceive and present the
case what were their lawyering strategies and ho~ did they
shape the way the case ultimately turned out? So, too, what of
roles played by the trial judge, and in some instances, an
intermediate appellate court?

138. GUGGENHEIMCOJ.I.ECTION,supra note 135, at 58.
139. See id. 52-53. Interestingly, Brancusci intended his abstract wooden sculptures to be a
"poetic evocation of spiritual thought." /d. at 52. Cf Robert F. Blomquist, Law and Spirituality: Some
First Thoughts on an Emerging Relation, 11 UMKCL. REv. 583 (2003) (encouraging the etnergence
of Jaw and spirituality as a new interdisciplinary field of scholarship).
140. See supra notes 86-139 and accompanying text.
141. See TORTS STORIES (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003).
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As these lines of inquiry are meant to suggest, every tort case
begins with a particular misadventure of its own, and runs the
course of a system in which distinct contributions are made by a
variety of participants along the way to final resolution. To view
these elements in fine detail is to understand the dynamic
character of tort law indeed, the dynamic character of the
common law, more generally in a fashion that by its very nature
142
cannot be fully conveyed in an appellate judicial opinion.
Going beyond the published appellate opinions in tort cases to examine and
appreciate the economic situation of a tort plaintiff, like part-time janitor and parttime cleaning wotnan Helen Palsgraf in the famous case of Palsgrafv. Long Island
143
Railroad Co., clarifies the role of economic class in early twentieth century
America, and the insensitivities of the upper-middle-class judges to serious injuries
144
and inability to earn a living.
Ascertaining the character of a tort plaintiff demonstrates the risks that good
samaritans often face in the real world. Take, for example, Donald MacPherson,
145
plaintiff in the celebrated case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., who was on
"a mission of mercy" to transport his friend to a far-off hospital for hand surgery
146
Then consider the
when one of the wheels of his automobile collapsed.
seemingly all-American Iowa farm couple Mr. and Mrs. Edward Briney in Katko
141
v. Briney, forced to pay considerable compensatory and punitive damages to the
thief Marvin Katko, who was severely injured by a 20-gauge spring shotgun, set
earlier by the Brineys, when he broke into their vacant farm house near Oskaloosa,
148
Iowa. Fathotning the full, gritty, oppressive magnitude of the legal consequences
visited upon them enables society to sympathize with the hapless suffering of wellintentioned, but imperfect, property owners, while also feeling the pain of a
common thief who, nevertheless, deserved a tort remedy for injuries received from
protective measures taken by property owners out of all proportion to decency and
149
good sense.

142. Id. at 1.
143. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
144. See Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman, Introduction to TORTS STORlES 2-8 (Robert
L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003); see also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MAsKS
OF THE LAW I 11-51 (1976) (noting Cardozo's disturbingly concise statementofthe facts inPalsgraf,
shedding no light upon the individual players in the case and the ensuing disappearance of the
personalities behind the shadow of emerging tort theory); RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY
IN REPUTATION 33-48 (1990) (discussing Palsgrafs celebrity, due in part to Cardozo's economical
statement of the facts, which omits all extraneous details of Mrs. Palsgrar s background).
145. Ill N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
146. James A. Henderson, Jr., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company: Simplifying the Facts
While Reshaping the Law, in TORTS STORIES, supra note 141, at 41-43.
147. 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971).
148. /d. at 658-59 (Larson, J., dissenting).
149. The Iowa Supreme Court affinned Katko'sjury verdict of$20,000 in actual damages and
$10,000 in punitive damages. /d. at 658, 662. The rest of the story is fascinating and painful to
contemplate. "Katko pled guilty to petty larceny and received a 30-day suspended sentence and a $50
fine," JOHN W. WADE ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 109 (9th ed. 1994), for breaking and
entering the Briney's vacant property with intent to steal old bottles and fruit jars which he thought
were antiques. Katko, 183 N.W.2d at 658. "The Brineys bad to sell SO acres of their 120-acre fann
in order to pay the judgment in this case." WADE ET AL., supra, at 109. Moreover, "(a] strange
development later arose between the parties:"
When the 80 acres were put up for judgment sale and there were no bids above
the minimum price of$1 0,000, three neighbors borrowed money to purchase the
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Looking at a case from the standpoint of race, ethnicity, or gender
considerations afford some illuminating insights. Take for example, Mary O'Brien,
the Irish immigrant wotnan who sued a steamship line for battery because the ship
surgeon gave 0 'Brien a vaccination before she came ashore to her new home in the
150
United States.
In 0 'Brien v. Cunard, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts affrmted the directed verdict in favor of the Cunard Steam-Ship
151
Company based on the privilege of apparent consent. But why did the American
152
From her
courts dispense such harsh judgment on a female Irish immigrant?
perspective, Ms. O'Brien likely felt intimidated and powerless to speak up, as the
other 200 immigrant passengers no doubt felt. Was the judiciary correct to assume
that Ms. O'Brien was literate and could read the various "notices" of the quarantine
153
regulations about the need to obtain a vaccination?
The perspectives of lawyers in a tort case such as the W obum, Massachusetts
154
groundwater contamination toxic tort case, Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., reflect the
155
From the perspective of the
different versions of reality involved in that dispute.
plaintiffs' lawyer, Jan Schlichtmann, the litigation process which resulted in a
bifurcated trial with the groundwater contamination causation tried frrst led to
156
From the perspective of the defendant
a lengthy, expensive, and unjust result.
W . R. Grace & Co.'s lawyer, William Cheeseman, the way the case unfolded
supported his client's view that "no credible scientific evidence [existed] that the

land for a dollar more, expecting to hold it for the Brineys until they won their
appeaL When they did not win, the neighbors leased the land back to them for
enough to pay taxes and interest costs on the money the neighbors had borrowed.
Several years later when land values rose, the neighbors offered to sell it back to
[the] Brineys at a price they could not afford. One of the neighbors then bought
the property from the others for $16,000 and sold it to his son for $16,500. [The]
Briney[s] and Katko, to whom the Brineys still owed money from the judgment,
then sued the neighbors, arguing that the land was being held in trust for the
Brineys and that they were entitled to the profit from the increase in value. Just
before the case came to trial, it was settled for a sum large enough to pay the
remainder of [the] Brineys' judgment to Katko.
/d. "A public outcry about the decision resulted in the introduction of 'Briney Bills' in several state
legislatures." /d.
150. O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266, 266 (Mass. 1891).
151. /d. at 266-67.
152. See generally Ann C. Shalleck, Feminist Legal Theory and the Reading of 0 'Brien v.
Cunard, 51 Mo. L. REv. 371 (1992) (oneofmanyarticles in a symposium edition on the O'Brien case).
153. /d. at 375-77.
154. 862 F.2d 910 (lst Cir. 1988), aff'g 96 F.R.D. 431 (D. Mass. 1983).
155. See generally LEWIS A. GROSSMAN & ROBERT G. VAUGHN, A DocUMENTARY COMPANION
TO A CIVIL ACTION (rev. ed. 2002) (compilation of documents from the Anderson v. Cryovac case, with

introductory writings by the primary lawyers for each of the parties involved).
156. Schlichtmann expressed his perspective as follows:
l suggest one way to judge the Rules and their application in the Woburn
case is by reference to the first rule: Rule I of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that the rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action." Judged by this yardstick, how
did the application of the Civil Rules to the Woburn case measure up? Can nine
years of litigation be called "speedy''? Can litigation that consumed tens of
thousands of hours of work by hundreds of people at the cost of tens of millions
[of] dollars be fairly characterized as "inexpensive''? And can the resolution be ·
tenned "just"? It was a resolution that involved a trial at which no family
member was allowed to tell his or her story; legal judgments about the world
which facts and the passage of time have demonstrated were clearly wrong; and
a record that was admittedly corrupted.
Jan Richard Schlichtmann, Introduction to LEWIS A. GROSSMAN & ROBERT G. VAUGHN, A
DOCUMENTARY COMPANION TO A CIVIL ACTION, at xxvi (rev. ed. 2002).
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Grace chemicals could have reached the municipal wells before the wells were
taken out of service" and "no evidence [showed] that these chemicals are capable
157
of causing" childhood leukemias and other physical maladies.
And, from the perspective of Jerome P. Facher, lawyer for the defendant
Beatrice Foods Company, the result of the Anderson case was appropriate because
Beatrice Foods did not legally cause the plaintiffs' injuries and deaths. Facher
explained his view:
I am always surprised by those who can comfortably rush to the
conclusion that a "deep pocket" defendant, once accused of
wrongdoing, must or should somehow be liable for a plaintiffs
serious personal injuries. In doing so, their conclusions whether
motivated by sympathy, compassion or outrage ignore the legal
necessity to prove that the defendant's conduct caused the
plaintiffs injuries. In Anderson, the plaintiffs brought their claim
to the civil justice system for resolution by a jury on the facts and
the law. Their lawyers knew that, in that system, liability is based
on fault, that fault is established by evidence, and that no loss can
be shifted from an injured party to a defendant without frrst
showing that the defendant's cQnduct caused that loss. It is still
one of the basic principles of our civil justice system that no party
should pay for losses it did not cause, no matter how serious the
injury. In Anderson, that basic principle was reaffirmed by the
158
vecy system the plaintiffs chose to decide their dispute.

4.

Dissociative Aesthetics

Sometimes, those that talk about tort law have difficulty providing coherent
fonns; sometimes, conunentators try to dissolve tort law forms. Professor Schlag
said, "The experience of dissociation might be described as the unraveling of a
159
secure identity to the point at which we really do not know what it is anymore."
His reasoning is as follows:
One concept lapses into the next as the differentiations
dissipate. In the dissociative aesthetic, the state, legal rules,
custom, and psychological dispositions are not external to each
other; they are already glommed onto each other. In the
dissociative aesthetic, one comes to recognize that various
identities to wit, law, the state, rules, custom, psychological
disposition, and more are already so conjoined that no
conceptual work can separate them out. The sensation here is of
conceptual quicksand, of distinctions that dissipate -a kind of

157. William J. Cheeseman, Introduction to LEWIS A. GROSSMAN & ROBERT G. VAUGHN, A
. DOCUMENTARY COMPANION TO A CIVIL ACTION, at xiv (rev. ed. 2002).
158. Jerome P. Facher, Introduction to LEWIS A. GROSSMAN & ROBERT G. VAUGHN, A
DocUMENTARY COMPANION TO A CIVlLACTIONlt at xxiii (rev. ed. 2002); see also Robert F. Blomquist,
Bottomless Pit: Toxic Trials, the American Legal Profossion, and Popular Perceptions ofthe Law, 81
CORNELLL. REv. 953 (1996) (reviewing Jonathon Harr's A Civil Action, and specifically, the problem
of "indeternrinate defendants,').
·
159. Schlag, supra note 72, at 1097.
•
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virtual.J:risprudential reality in which identities morph into each
other.'
Considering Professor Goldberg's description of the scholarly displeasure with
161
modern American tort law, this frustration and unwillingness to love tort law is
likely due to tort scholars being stranded in a dissociative aesthetic that sees no
rhyme or reason, no coherence, and no utility for tort law grids, energies, and
perspectives. Scholarly tort unlovers' understanding might be labeled a pessimistic
dissociative aesthetic that is wedded to logic and therefore, is dismayed at the
"hypertrophied differentiation" of modem tort law and experiences "a moment at
which the accumulation of differentiations comes crashing down, leaving the legal
162
But, this scholarly pessimistic
self flailing around in intellectual mush. "
dissociative aesthetic overlooks a more optimistic dissociative aesthetic that
unleashes creativity in fotmulating and reconstructing new tort law:
[To] appreciate the ways in which legal identities can collapse
into a multitude of associations allows the advocate or judge to
reconstruct those identities in desired ways. This breakdown and
reconstruction is perhaps the most intense aesthetic moment in
163
law-the point at which the legal profession is creating law.
An optimistic dissociative aesthetic for modem tort law, therefore, allows
advocates, judges, and legal scholars, in extraordinary cases, to contemplate ''new
164
torts": new concepts, new doctrines, new rules, and even new causes of action.
In less extraordinary tort cases, an optimistic dissociative aesthetic, drawing upon
insights from legal realism, moral theory, and critical legal studies, can empower
advocates and judges to reformulate and reconstruct tort law doctrines, moral
165
Even in ordinary tort cases, an optimistic
justifications, and social visions.
dissociative aesthetic allows advocates and judges to shape the "facts," and
therefore, the dispositive tort "law" of the dispute:
[An optimistic dissociative aesthetic] knows that "the law" and
"the facts" are created in light of each other. Practicing lawyers
know that, in an important sense, "the facts" are effects of sundry
perfonnances: recollections, statements, behaviors, affects,
linguistic performances of clients, witnesses, experts, and more.
They know, as well, that the law is, in an important sense, an
amalgamation of signs, beliefs, events, linguistic expressions,
habits, perceptions, and prejudices that the lawyer helps compose
for the occasion: for the client, the judge, and other relative

160. ld. (emphasis added).

161. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
162. Schlag, supra note 72, at 11 01.
163. /d. at 1098 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
164. See generally Robert F. Blomquist, "New Torts": A Critical History, Taxonomy, and
Appraisal, 95 DICK. L. REv. 23, 129 (1990) ("At its essence ... the term 'new tort,' as used by
American courts and commentators over the past one hundred years, is an indication, an item of
circumstantial evidence, that a court is being requested to or has decided to use judicial creativity to
alter existing tort law.").
165. See, e.g., HENRY J. STEINER, MORAL ARGUMENT AND SOCIAL VISION IN THE COURTS: A
STUDY OF TORT ACCIDENT LAW ( 1987) (exploring the evolution of tort accident law and the
background influences of moral justifications and social vision on judicial opinions).
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audiences. The lawyer knows that both law and facts are, in
important ways, productions. In experiencing the fluidity of law
and fact, the lawyer is enacting the [optimistic] dissociative
aesthetic. It is, of course, often her job, as she writes her brief or
her clo_sing argument, ~o re·duce this fluidi~ to the crystal clarity
66
of a gnd or to the movtng force of energy.
IV.

LEA~JNG TO LoVE TORTS

Based on the insights of Professor Goldberg, legal scholars should learn to
champion and love modem American tort law for five reasons. First, loving torts
allows scholars to appreciate the complexity· of the facts and legal constructs that
compromise this unruly branch of the law without conditioning our approval on any
particular aesthetic or aesthetics.. This appreciation can allow boundaries to
167
dissolve and legal activity to thrive.
Second, the grid aesthetic of tort law compromising the marvelous
cubbyholes of separately named torts along with the accompanying doctrines,
principles~ rules is an abstract thing of beauty and some ugliness, harmony and
some disharmony, and order and some disorder,
169

168

that constitutes the system of

private law that governs social relations. The grid aesthetic, on which Professor
Weinrib focuses with majestic insight, reveals the goodness, nonnatiye force, and
170
internal intelligibility oftort law's concern for non·functionalist corrective justice.
Such aesthetic for1n is worthy of admiration and love.
Third, the energy aesthetic of tort law consisting of the multiple policies that
expand, compress, or reconfigure the tort grid in interesting ways should instill
in observers of tort law the excitement and love for the vibrating forces that pull and
push (in the artistic physics of functional, public law) on tort categories and
171
presuppositions.
Fourth, the perspectivist aesthetic of tort law, with its different views, diverse
~xpe~ences, ~d multiple ~terests, shoul~ insgire fo!ldness, fancy, and devoti~n .to
2
hsterung, tellmg, and re-tellmg of tort stones.' Lovmg torts from the perspecttvtst
aesthetic, however, requires both a detached and unconditional appraisal of the mix
of tort stories and the cultivation of a taste for plaintiffs' tort stories, defendants' tort
stories, and non-litigant institutional tort stories.
Fifth, the dissociative aesthetic of tort law, with its incoherent fonns,
dissolution of categories, and sense of collapse, is often jarring, disorienting, and
frightening, but can lead legal scholars to transfonnational experiences in · . · g
,.

166. Schlag, supra note 72, at 1098 (footnotes omitted). "In a tough case, however, it will often
be a better brief and a better closing argument ifshe has experienced the dissociative aesthetic (before
engaging in the reduction)." /d. ·
167. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 86-117 and accoDtpanying text.
169. See supra notes 40-61 and acc<>mpanying text.
170. See supra notes 49-71 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 118-40 and accompanying text; see generally Robert F. Blomquist, Goals,
Means, _and Problems for Modern Tort Law: A Reply to Professor Priest, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 621
(1988) (criticizing Professor George Priest's article Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L.
REv. I (1987), and its focus on a limited number of goals tort law serves in this modern, diverse
society).
172. See supra notes 141-58 and accompanying text.
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about tort law and, in the final analysis, can coax "tough love" .and appreciation for
173
the catalytic potential of legal deconstruction as a prelude to legal construction.
V.

CONCLUSION

In a follow-up article to his Vanderbilt Law Review essay about the "unloved"
174
quality ofmodem tort law, Professor Goldberg wrote about twentieth-century tort
175
theory. Interestingly, he suggests that one possible response to tort law theory is
to "adopt a stance of congenial pluralism" because modem "[t]ort law is a
multifaceted enterprise, so . . . each theory brings something to the table" and
"[e]ach ... highlights factors that matter to tort law, and we should embrace them
176
all. "
Goldberg, however, ultimately rejects ''congenial pluralism" at least for
tort scholars, while suggesting that judges might benefit from this
approach because, while "congenial pluralism is surely appropriate as an antidote
to dogmatism," ultimately, "it leaves academics with_nothing more to do than to talk
177
past one another." Suggesting that academics "[c]auld ... do a little better than
178
that," Professor Goldberg offered a set ofcritical "methodological guidelines" for
179
the development of twenty-frrst century tort law.
Perhaps, Goldberg wants to fully love tort law 'but is afraid to validate (and,
therefore, love) each and every aspect of tort law because of concerns about
"coherence a demand rooted in elemental notions of fairness, predictability, and
180
efficacy." Goldberg wants tort scholars (and presumably tort students, judges,
and legislators) to talk with one another instead of past one another; but, by
implication, Goldberg wants to discredit and undennine (and, therefore, not fully
love) what he views as incoherent accounts of tort law. These accounts, which
presumably for him, would attempt to merely "explain or defend tort in tenns of
181
beauty or elegance. "
·
Humbly, this Article suggests that learning to love torts in all its
capaciousness and messiness is a necessary condition to creatively reforn1ulating
182
'tort law for the twenty-frrst century. And, learning to appreciate and to validate
the four aesthetics of modem tort law the grid, energy, perspectivist, and
dissociative, whether they reveal beauty or elegance, ugliness or disorder, coherence

173. See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
174. Goldberg, supra note 1.
175. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, supra note 3.
t 76. /d. at 578.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

/d. at 581.
/d.
/d. at 581-82.
/d. at 580.

Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, supra note 3, at 580.
182. The following describes one of the greatest literary works on love:
Lucretius opens his poem On The Nature of Things with an invocation to Venus,
''the life-giver" without whom nothing "comes forth into the bright coasts of
life, nor waxes glad nor lovely." Nor is it only the poet who speaks
metaphorically of love as the creative force which engenders things and renews
them, or as the power which draws all things together into a unity . . . . The
imagery of love appears even in the language of science. The descripti()n of
magnetic attraction and repulsion borrows some of its fundamental tenns from the
vocabulary of the passions; Gilbert, for example, refers to "the love of the iron for
the loadstone.,_,
1 THE GREAT IDEAS: A SYNTOPICON OF GREAT BOOKS OF lHE WESTERN WORlD 1051 (Mortimer J.
Adler & William Gorman eds., 1952) (Volume 2 of GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD (Robert
Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952)).
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or incoherence is a necessary condition to loving torts. Thinking about tort law
should be more in the nature of assembling collectibles like biscuit tins, chewing
gum wrappers, cotnics, art deco, ink wells, napkin rings, spittoons, or Civil War
memorabilia. Many collectibles, in their own time, were "unfamiliar, and very
183
But over time, many collectibles became
possibly unloved or misunderstood."
cutting-edge, interesting, and loved. Before we judge it, let us truly lean1 to love
tort law.

183. CAROL PRISANT, ANTIQUES ROADSHOW lOTH CENTURY COI .LECTIBLES xxv (2003 ).

